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 Between Law and Transnational Social Movement Organisations: 
Stabilising Expectations of Global Public Goods 
 
 
MARK HANNA* 
 
 
 
This article draws on the theory and method of Niklas Luhmann to present transnational social 
movement organisations as a solution to the problem of increased expectations of global public 
goods which fail to find adequate accommodation in law. As a concrete example of the limits 
of law in this respect, the article examines the non liquet of the World Court on the question of 
the illegality of nuclear weapons. The trajectory of antinuclear norms is traced beyond the 
limits of law to the alternative structure of transnational social movement organisations, and 
the article presents such organisations as stabilising increased expectations of global public 
goods through their recursive decision-making and their capacity to continuously project those 
expectations at the legal and political systems. This generates observations on the concept of 
‘global governance’, the structural relations between global civil society and international 
law, and the role of this form of organisation in the evolution of the global political system.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Globalisation has led to increased expectations of what can aptly be described as ‘global public 
goods’. The original economic idea of goods which are non-rival in their consumption and non-
excludable in their costs and benefits1 proves useful to conceptualising the temporal and spatial 
‘externalities’ which emerged with globalisation.2 Of course, public goods often find their most 
cogent expression as negative externalities at the global level. Compared to positive 
formulations of ‘common wellbeing’ or even ‘common humanity’, problems like global 
warming, global financial crisis or nuclear war have a much more concrete ‘universal reach’,3 
while the risk they pose proves much easier to generalise.4 Indeed the ‘equalizing effect’ of 
such problems can now galvanise common expectations of a significant class of world society,5 
and in turn these expectations can increasingly find structure in a ‘global public sphere’6 that 
is emerging with the advance of communication technology and the more general development 
of world society as a communicative network. This is not to say that such negative formulations 
of global public goods enjoy universal legitimacy—admittedly they often remain politically or 
scientifically contested. But they nonetheless remain relevant to law,7 for as long as the 
corresponding risks are perceived to be ‘real’, and that the conditions which underpin them are 
‘anthropogenic’,8 they will generate global protest and a reference point for the development 
of law. 
The modern legal system has nonetheless been exhausted by these developments. On the 
one hand, the accommodation of expectations of global public goods has been clearly limited 
                                                          
1 P. Samuelson, ‘The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure’ (1954) 36 The Review of Economics and Statistics 387. 
2 W. Nordhaus, ‘Paul Samuelson and Global Public Goods’, in Samuelsonian Economics and the Twenty-First 
Century, eds. A. Gottesman, L. Ramrattan, and M. Szenberg (2006) 91.  
3 And, thus, a more urgent and concrete need for ‘issue-specific policy and management’, I. Kaul, ‘Global Public 
Goods: Explaining their Underprovision’ (2012) 15 Journal of International Economic Law 740. 
4 This is the reason they tend to be ‘overprovided’, D. Bodansky, ‘What is in a Concept? Global Public Goods, 
International Law, and Legitimacy’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 658.  
5 U. Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992) 36. 
6 M. Schiltz, G. Verschraegen and S. Magnolo, ‘Open Access to Knowledge in World Society?’ (2005) 11 Soziale 
Systeme 351. 
7 This needs to be stressed, as there is something of a dominating governance perspective in global legal studies 
which leads all too often to global public goods being hastily disregarded as irrelevant. See D. Augenstein, ‘To 
Whom it May Concern: International Human Rights Law and Global Public Goods’ (2016) 23 Indiana Journal 
of Global Legal Studies 246 (who, rightly concerned with the expansion of the state under the conditions of 
globalisation, nonetheless allows this perspective to obscure the relevance of ‘interests and values of common 
concern’). See also, N. Walker, ‘Human Rights and Global Public Goods: The Sound of One Hand Clapping?’ 
(2016) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 248, 253 (where the focus on ‘political morality’ and ‘political 
authority’ only leads to ‘frustration with the phenomenon of one hand clapping’). 
8 N. Oreskes, ‘On the “Reality” and Reality of Anthropogenic Climate Change’ (2013) 119 Climatic Change 560. 
by the foundational reference of public international law to sovereignty doctrine.9 Within this 
framework, expectations of global public goods are always liable to be frustrated by the 
‘privilege’ of the sovereign nation-state.10 On the other hand, the problem cannot be solved 
purely in the private realm.11 Specialised private regimes operating beyond the nation-state will 
always struggle to accommodate the general nature of global public goods, just as they will 
always leave far too many hostages to fortune within the sovereign boundaries of nation-
states.12 Despite globalisation, there is nothing to suggest state sovereignty is losing much of 
its operational value in legal and political decision making, and thus one can hardly expect 
programmatic and sustained attempts to address climate change or nuclear weapons, for 
example, without some kind of engagement with international institutions and, at least, the 
prospect of inducing the action of nation-states. 
Typically, any approach departing from this perspective of increased expectations of 
‘global public goods’ vis-a-vis the limits of the modern legal (and/or political) system, and 
seeking to explore solutions to this problem, will tend toward the ‘global governance’ 
paradigm. The distinction between ‘governance’ and ‘government’ has certainly allowed 
research to overcome the problematic of political organisation through sovereign nation-states 
and opened it to a much broader horizon of societal organisation.13 It offers in this sense a 
broad vista ‘for describing growing complexity in the way the world is organized and authority 
exercised’,14 and a way of constructing solutions to global problems of a public nature which 
‘cannot be addressed by states alone’, and which must be addressed ‘incrementally by diverse 
types of collectivities’.15  
Whilst this article shares this focus of global governance studies to a degree, it aims to 
employ an alternative optic for examining the issue of global public goods and the limits of 
law. Though the category is vague enough to be inclusive, global governance studies share a 
core common focus on ‘steering’ and ‘power’ at the transnational level. Even in its broadest 
                                                          
9 See N. Krisch, ‘The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods’ (2014) 108 
American Journal of International Law 1. 
10 D. Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’ (2008) 34 Ohio Northern University Law Review 849. 
11 This was the original point of the economic theory of public goods, op. cit. n.1. 
12 See G. Verscharaegen, ‘Hybrid Constitutionalism, Fundamental Rights and the State’ (2011) 40 Netherlands 
Journal of Legal Philosophy 224-225. 
13 As Weiss and Wilkinson point out, ‘to speak of “governance” and not “government” is to discuss the product 
and not the producer’, T. Weiss and R. Wilkinson, ‘Rethinking Global Governance? Complexity, Authority, 
Power, Change’ (2014) 58 International Studies Quarterly 213.  
14 id., p. 207.  See also, C. Murphy, ‘Global Governance: Poorly Done and Poorly Understood’, (2000) 76 
International Affairs 789. 
15 See J. Rosenau, ‘Change, Complexity and Governance in a Globalizing Space’, in Debating Governance, ed. 
Jon Pierre (2000) 167. See also, T. Risse, 2004. ‘Global Governance and Communicative Action’ (2004) 39 
Government and Opposition 298.  
formulations, global governance is seen as occurring when transnational networks 
‘authoritatively steer constituents towards public goals’,16 as a ‘process whereby an 
organization or society steers itself’, a process ‘whereby values and behaviours at one level get 
converted into still other consequences at still more encompassing levels’, and whereby 
‘commands flow in the form of goals framed, directives issued, and policies pursued’.17 
Governance, however, is not the only way to address this problem of global public goods 
and the limits of law. Beyond the problem of ensuring collectively binding decisions at the 
transnational level, there is also the different problem of stabilising expectations of global 
public goods which fail to find accommodation in law. To put it an anthropocentric way, where 
do people go with their expectations of global public goods when law clearly and categorically 
fails to give them any structure? This problem may be more abstract than global governance, 
but it is nonetheless just as discernible on examination. One can see the persistence of these 
expectations at various levels of world society, in the operation of peremptory norms, in 
transnational jurisprudence, in public interest litigation and letters to courts, in protest 
movements and the communications of a global civil society, in online social networks, in the 
newspapers, and public events staged by popular musicians and celebrities.  
This article will use the functional method and systems theory of Niklas Luhmann as an 
alternative optic through which to explore the problem and its solutions. From this perspective, 
the political system—as one functional subsystem among others—appears less important.18 
The function for which the political system is differentiated is characterised as the ‘capacity to 
supply collectively binding decisions’,19 and this presupposes the evolved institutionalisation 
of political power as a ‘symbolically generalised medium of communication’.20 Such an 
arrangement has only come about at the national level through a long co-evolution of the 
political and legal systems which allowed each to externalise their foundational paradox in 
                                                          
16 L. Andanova, M. Bestill and H. Bulkeley, ‘Transnational Climate Governance’ (2009) 9 Global Environmental 
Politics 56. 
17 J. Rosenau, ‘Governance in the Twenty-first Century’ (1995) 1 Global Governance 14-16. 
18 As King and Thornhill point out, ‘the importance that Luhmann ascribes to the political system is strictly 
limited.’ M. King and C. Thornhill, Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law (2003) 70. 
19 N. Luhmann, Political Theory in the Welfare State (1990) 74. See also, N. Luhmann, Die Politik der 
Gesellschaft (2000) 7.  
20 id. (1990), pp. 74, 157. See also N. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law (1985) 85. ‘Power’ here is taken 
in a narrow sense, that is, from the trivial observation that, ‘power is always a matter of a social relation in 
which action could have always been different on both sides of the relation.’ One only submits to power if one 
can imagine and prefer other possibilities of action, while, on the other hand, one only exercises power where 
they perceive such ‘other possibilities’ and set out on a course of action to limit this. Luhmann labels this as 
‘double contingency’, whereby things are neither ‘necessary or impossible’, and which therefore constitutes a 
problem for meaningful communication in society. Power is thereby ‘recognizable and practicable only if the 
behaviour of the participants is ascribed to a symbolic code that describes the situations of power’, Luhmann, 
op. cit. (1990), n. 19, pp. 155-57.  
such a way that violence exercised in the name of law could be referred to the will of the 
political sovereign, while at the same time the political system could refer to due process of 
law so that the nation-state’s use of violence did not appear arbitrary.21 Obviously similar 
structural couplings have not yet evolved at the global level, and, as long as the global political 
system continues to be segmentarily differentiated into sovereign nation-states it is doubtful 
whether they ever will.  
Luhmann’s theory and method thus provide a different perspective on the problem from 
the global governance focus on ‘steering’22 and political power at the transnational level.23 
What it offers instead is a perspective on the function of law in stabilising counterfactual 
expectations, as well as a useful corresponding method to search for functional equivalents.24 
Although relatively unexplored, this proves useful for gaining insights into the problem of 
global public goods which cannot be addressed under current conditions and which rely instead 
on the evolution of world society. Using this theory and method, the article will construct the 
problem and its alternative solutions to provide information on the development of law and its 
functional equivalents in this reference. More specifically, the article will use this approach to 
present transnational social movement organisations (referred to simply as ‘TSMOs’ from here 
on) as functional equivalents to law in respect of expectations of global public goods. 
In presenting this empirical possibility, the article will underline the important role 
TSMOs play in the global normative order and their contribution to meaningful communication 
about the global public goods which necessarily emerge with globalisation. But it will also 
generate information about the increasing role of TSMOs in the global political order. 
Although it aims to avoid the method and focus of global governance studies, highlighting the 
possible function of TSMOs in stabilising expectations of global public goods will hang a 
question over whether some of what is often captured and labelled as ‘global governance’ is 
not instead a different, apolitical function of stabilising expectations of global public goods 
which find no proper accommodation in traditional legal and political structures. Finally, whilst 
none of this amounts to the construction of social movement organisations taking part in global 
                                                          
21 N. Luhmann, Law as a Social System (2004) 264. 
22 The concept of ‘steering’ is particularly problematic from this perspective. See N. Luhmann, ‘Limits of 
Steering’ (1997) 14 Theory, Culture & Society 41. 
23 Which is why accounts that have employed aspects of this approach to construct societal constitutionalism at 
the transnational level have so far been limited to a focus on ‘constitutional fragments’ and the pouvoir 
constituent within each differentiated normative order at this level, with all external relations characterised as 
cognitive and involving only learning pressures for the transfer of meaning from one different order to another.  
See G. Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization (2012), or P. Kjaer, 
Constitutionalism in the Global Realm: A Sociological Approach (2014). 
24  N. Luhmann, Social Systems (1995). 
governance and political power at the transnational level on an operational level, it will also 
raise a question as to whether the proliferation of TSMOs has some relevance for the global 
governance on the semantic level. That is, whether, in their increasing importance in the global 
normative order, TSMOs communicate a necessary ‘opposition’ to existing government—an 
alternative, that is, to the existing global political system, and thus a way out of the cul-de-sac 
of talking about political solutions to global problems in the international framework. 
This is admittedly a bold development of Luhmann’s theory. Luhmann can be said to 
have displayed a ‘lack of sympathy’ towards social movements,25 with some even going so far 
as to suggesting that he aimed to ‘discredit’ such movements.26 Moreover, it is true that 
Luhmann was generally sceptical about the extent to which social movements were capable of 
formal organisation, and, toward the end of his career, for example, was only prepared to admit 
that social movements ‘secrete’ organisation for ‘residual purposes’.27 However, the 
organisation of social movements simply did not figure in Luhmann’s research interests (i.e., 
the subject was not selected for research), and for that reason may represent something of a 
blind spot in his theory. Luhmann was aware, for example, that the inherent ‘risk’ which comes 
with technological development, and the increasing generalisation of values and norms that 
comes with advanced functional differentiation, were both placing an excessive burden on 
law,28 and even acknowledged the proliferation of social movements as a solution in this 
respect.29 As an avid reader who always kept abreast of developments in sociology, he should 
also have been aware of growing sociological research from the mid-1960s onwards which 
documented the increase in social movement organisation and focused on this development as 
important.30  
As will be demonstrated in the following analysis, it is a relatively short and 
straightforward step to extending this theory and method to construct the function of TSMOs 
                                                          
25 I. Blühdorn, Post-Ecologist Politics: Social Theory and The Abdication Of The Ecologist Paradigm (2000) 
126. 
26 S. Fuchs, ‘The Self-Organization of Social Movements’ (2006) 19 Systemic Practice and Action Research 
1254. 
27 N. Luhmann, Theory of Society: Vol. 2 (2013) 156. See also, N. Luhmann, Risk: A Sociological Theory (1993) 
128. 
28 Luhmann, op. cit., n. 21, pp. 468ff; Luhmann, op. cit. (1993), n. 27, p. 60.  
29 Luhmann, op. cit. (2013), n. 27, pp. 154-65; Luhmann, op. cit., n. 24, pp. 398-404; Luhmann, op. cit. (1993), n. 
27, pp. 125-45. 
30 See for example, M. Zald and R. Ash, ‘Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change’ (1966) 
44 Social Forces 327; J. McCarthy and M. Zald, The Trend of Social Movements in America: 
Professionalization and Resource Mobilization (1973); J. McCarthy and M. Zald, ‘Resource Mobilization and 
Social Movements: A Partial Theory’ (1977) 82 American Journal of Sociology 1212; Jenkins, J. ‘Radical 
Transformation of Organizational Goals’ (1977) 22 Administrative Science Quarterly 568-586; C. Tilly, From 
Mobilization to Revolution (1978); M. Zald and J. McCarthy, Social Movements in an Organizational Society 
(1987); J. Lofland, Social Movement Organizations (1996). 
in stabilising increased normative expectations of global public goods, and thereby providing 
a functional equivalent to law in this respect.  
 In order to arrive at this position, however, it is necessary to go through the process of 
applying the theory and method to the problem of global public goods which go under-realised 
in law. The first section of this article will therefore briefly introduce the functional method 
which will be used to gain this perspective. The second section will employ this to construct 
the problem of counterfactual expectations and show how law has traditionally provided the 
system through which the social force of those expectations can be channelled and ‘cooled-
out’.  
The third section will then turn to examining a concrete example of the limits of this 
problem-solution relationship in relation to global public goods. As law is not a system which 
easily admits limits, however, this need to be definite, and thus the article will identify and 
explore the non liquet of the World Court in the Nuclear Weapons opinion31 as a rare example 
of such clear limits to law in relation to a global public good. Expectations of the prohibition 
of the threat or use of nuclear weapons are a sound example of a negative formulation of a 
global public good. The potential catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons for humanity and the 
natural environment alike are clearly of ‘near universal’ reach,32 and despite the fact that such 
a threat may appear too abstract for many, or even that some are satisfied with the tenuous, 
though necessary, arrangement of ‘mutually assured destruction’, there are enough people 
around the world who remain cognisant of the costs and benefits in this respect, and who 
perceive such weapons to be an unnecessary risk that only serves sectarian interests. While 
global governance of nuclear weapons is still vague and inadequate,33 the article will be able 
to focus on the more precise relationship between the problem of widespread anti-nuclear 
norms and their solutions at the transnational level.   
Using this mark of the limits of law, the fourth section will trace those expectations to 
alternative social structures of antinuclear (that is, civil) organisations who carry the norm 
                                                          
31 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996 (just ‘Nuclear 
Weapons Opinion’ from here on).  
32 Even the ‘tactical use’ of such weapons would resonate at a near universal level. In 2003 the U.S. National 
Academy of Sciences, on request of Congress, conducted a study into military claims of the tactical use of 
nuclear weapons as ‘robust nuclear earth-penetrating’ (RNEP) weapons. The National Academy of Sciences 
concluded that such ‘tactical use’ could kill anywhere from 100,000 to 1 million people if detonated near a 
metropolitan area. The development of RNEP weapons was subsequently denied funding by Congress, see 
Effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other Weapons (2005), Committee on the Effects of Nuclear Earth-
Penetrator and Other Weapons, Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, National Research Council, 
Washington, DC: The National Academic Press. 
33 See R. Thakur, ‘Nuclear Weapons: Global Governance Failing to Meet the Challenge’ (2013), Asia Pacific 
Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Policy Brief No. 3. 
along in their operations and promote it in their environment. This approach will finally present 
social movement organisations as functional equivalents to law in their ability to stabilise 
expectations of global public goods through recursive decision-making and through their 
ability to project the norms into their environment as proto-legal communications.  
In the last section, the article will discuss these findings by commenting on the need for 
lawyers to devote more attention to social movement organisation and what it says about the 
fragmentation of the global normative order. At the same time, it will also examine the 
structural relation between transnational civil society organisations and the evolution of the 
political system in globalised society. 
 
 
THE FUNCTIONAL METHOD  
 
The functional method developed by Luhmann has received little attention in relation to the 
systems theory it produced.34 The centrality of this method to the present study, nonetheless, 
demands some definite statement of the approach at the outset. Although its roots can be traced 
to some extent to the ‘functionalism’ of Merton, Parsons and Durkheim, this method must be 
distinguished from much of that which preceded it in sociology. Rather than starting with a 
given social structure before construing how it contributes to society, Luhmann’s approach 
involves a very definite methodology which starts with a problem and then looks for social 
structures which could serve as potential solutions. The goal here is not to establish causal 
relations between problems and solutions. The insight of the method, it is said, lies “athwart 
causalities: it resides in comparing them.”35 Does structure A, for example, provide a better 
solution to the problem than structure B? Established institutions can always be 
‘reproblematized’36 in this way and the problem used as a ‘connecting thread’ to further 
possibilities which can then be compared as ‘functional equivalents’.37 This means that, 
initially at least, causalities can be assumed to be ‘merely hypothetical’,38 and the problem-
solution relationships themselves can be acknowledged as ‘constructions’ of the observer’.39   
                                                          
34 Luhmann himself explained it only on a few occasions, see N. Luhmann, ‘Funktionale Methode und System-
theorie’ (1970) in Soziologische Aaufklärung, Vol. 1, 31-53; Luhmann, op. cit. n. 24, pp. 52-58.  
35 id., p. 53. 
36 N. Luhmann, Art as a Social System (2000) 138. 
37 Luhmann, op. cit., n. 24, p. 53. 
38 id. 
39 N. Luhmann, A Systems Theory of Religion (2013) 83.  
The method is thus deceptively simple, yet the complexity it reveals is formidable. By 
constructing a problem and then, rather than relying on taken-for-granted solutions, treating 
everything as contingent and searching out and comparing possible solutions on that basis, the 
observer is able to move past given social structures and thereby generate ‘information’.40 The 
method thereby achieves a certain ‘restlessness and an internal dynamic’, driving analyses 
further and generating further questions.41 Only the insights gained through this method 
provide the ‘scaffolding’ upon which underlying causalities might be investigated on a more 
empirical level.42 
This method is particularly suitable for analysing the problem of increasing 
expectations of global public goods which go under-accommodated in law. The general nature 
of such expectations, their formulation beyond established institutions and processes, means 
the problem can be easily obscured behind structures which have come to be taken for granted. 
This not only includes the structural conditions of sovereignty and dominating semantic value 
of the authority of law and politics within the institutional framework of nation-state and 
international organisations, but it also includes neo-liberal perspectives which assume an 
erosion of sovereign power with globalisation, and which thereby focus excessively on the 
development of law removed from state structures.  
To apply this method, and thereby bring into view other possibilities, the next section 
will begin by re-problematizing the accommodation of growing expectations of global public 
goods in law. Functional analysis can be said to be ‘as much about analysing the problem 
something is a solution to, as it is about analyzing how problems are solved.’43 Thus, the 
problem must first be construed as a clear point of reference so that it may serve as a connection 
to further possibilities. Only once the problem has been theoretically constructed to a sufficient 
degree, can it be used to steer the functional method to search for ‘tendencies that it regards as 
relevant and for which it can offer a meaningful interpretation.’44  
                                                          
40 Luhmann, op. cit., n. 24, p. 53. 
41 M. Knudsen, ‘Surprised by Method: Functional Method and Systems Theory’ (2010) 36 Historical Social 
Research 138. 
42 Luhmann, id., p. 54. Luhmann’s epistemological constructivism meant he was sceptical about any claim to 
empirical reality, viewing such claims as ‘constructions’ of the observer, see N. Luhmann, Theory of Society, 
Vol. 1 (2012) 16. However, Luhmann’s functional method still offers a valuable triangulation method which 
‘grasps’ reality as a ‘form of ordering vis-à-vis a reality that is also ordered’, and thus provides a way for 
generating meaningful information and for sharpening theoretical insights, Luhmann, op. cit., n. 24, pp. 54-58. 
Moreover, it is not necessary to adopt the full epistemological implications of the theory of self-referential 
systems in order to use this functional method. For an example of effective use of this functional method for 
developing more empirical research, see C. Thornhill, A Sociology of Constitutions (2012).  
43 Knudsen, op. cit., n. 41, p. 133. 
44 C. Besio and A. Pronzini, ‘Inside Organisations and Out: Methodological Tenets for Empirical Research 
Inspired by Systems Theory’ (2011) 36 Historical Social Research 22.  
  
NORMS AND THE FUNCTION OF LAW 
 
The problem of the limits of law in relation to increasing expectations of global public goods 
can only be glimpsed if one moves beyond the traditional distinction between facts and norms 
and the limitation of ‘norms’ to formally positivized rules.45 The concept of ‘norms’ must 
include the more basic social elements of counterfactual expectations, that is, expectations 
which signify a determination not to learn from disappointment.46 At the same time, the 
distinction between cognitive and normative expectations proves more useful—and much more 
‘sociological’ in terms of examining the elementary social conditions of law—than the more 
often used distinction between primary and secondary norms.47 The problem of expectations 
which, rather than learning through disappointment, are ‘adhered to, even when frustrated’,48 
is a problem for meaningful communication which leads to the emergence of ‘second level’ 
social structures to channel and augment the expectation and absorb any uncertainty 
surrounding it.49 For this reason, norms are seen to be endowed with a social force that 
stimulates the evolution of structures in which these expectations can be stabilised. In other 
words, they are a communicative dissent which enables the ‘take-off of social evolution’.50 
Law is the classic example of the social system which provides for this stabilisation of 
norms.51 Traditionally, the legal system has provided social support for contra-factual 
expectations ‘in a way that no other system does’.52 As formulated by Luhmann, law’s 
specialisation in this respect lies in its ability to simultaneously ‘generalize’ normative 
                                                          
45 See, for example, G-P. Calliess, ‘Reflexive Transnational Law: The Privatisation of Civil Law and the 
Civilisation of Private Law’, 23 Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie (2002) 195f.  
46 N. Luhmann, ‘Are There Still Indispensable Norms in Our Society?’ (2008) 14 Soziale Systeme 33. See also 
Luhmann, op. cit. (1985), n. 20, p. 32; Luhmann, op. cit., n. 21, p. 149.  
47 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1996). This also applies to approaches which rely on the distinction for 
constructing societal constitutionalism and which pay less attention to the problem of stabilising highly 
generalised normative expectations, see for example, G. Teubner, ‘A Constitutional Moment? The Logics of 
‘Hitting the Bottom’’, in The Financial Crisis in a Constitutional Perspective, eds. P. Kjaer and G. Teubner 
(2011) 27-28. 
48 Luhmann, op. cit. (2008), n. 46, p. 33.  
49 E. Christodoulidis, Law and Reflexive Politics (1998) 120. See also Luhmann, op. cit., n. 24, p. 324. 
50 H. Brunkhorst, Critical Theory of Legal Revolutions: Evolutionary Perspectives (2014) 15. See also Habermas, 
who, although he rejected the ‘time binding’ element of the norm, conceives of normative expectations as 
providing the ‘“must” of a weak transcendental necessity’ which forms the basis of complex negotiation 
between facts and validity, J. Habermas, Between facts and Norms (1996) 4, 17. 
51 Of course, law’s autonomy will depend upon its own selection of norms for legal institutionalisation, yet 
law’s function will refer its operations to well organised and communicated behavioural expectations which 
resist disappointment.  
52 Christodoulidis, op. cit., n. 49, p. 122.  
expectations in three separate dimensions: the temporal, social and factual dimensions.53 
Briefly stated, generalising the norm along the temporal dimension involves the 
institutionalisation of the time-binding form of normative expectations. Just as the normative 
expectation is projected against a disappointing future, law—as a system that operates through 
provisions which are binding in the future—is able to provide a medium which will carry this 
normativity through time and project it at a discrepant reality in the future. Generalisation of 
the norm in the social dimension, on the other hand, occurs when anonymised third parties 
represented by the institution also normatively co-expect it. This institutionalisation allows for 
expectations to be uploaded to a more systemic context and to be thereby generalised beyond 
the immediate interactional setting. Finally, the norm is generalised in the factual dimension 
of law when it is linked with some more abstract principle of meaning beyond the immediate 
interactional context. Rather than seeking meaningful identification with every individual 
expectation, law provides ‘more abstract types which can be held constant and then function 
as generative rules for individual expectations.’54 A new dishwasher machine that due to faulty 
internal wiring gives its owner a violent electric shock, a defective car tyre that blows out for 
no apparent reason causing the driver to crash into another vehicle, or the storage of hazardous 
waste that accidently leaks into local wells and forces the municipality to spend money on a 
filtration system, are all very different fact patterns that may nonetheless garner expectations 
which attach to the same abstract principle of strict liability in tort. In this way, legal meaning 
can be said to provide a ‘context of expectations’, and thereby endow the norm with further 
meaning and stabilise it against contradictory facts.55   
Luhmann presents the function of law as the ‘congruent generalisation’ of behavioural 
expectations in all three of these dimensions at once.56 The improbability of this achievement 
takes on a central importance for the systems theoretical concept of the function of law, yet the 
scheme will be used here as a measuring device to compare functional equivalents to law in 
stabilising normative expectations of global public goods. Expectations of global public goods 
which go under-accommodated in law must also be recognised as normative in so far as they 
can resist disappointing experience. Expectations of global public goods will not simply learn 
if they fail to find accommodation in law. Moreover, these expectations are now so organised 
and purposely communicated that they cannot be limited to the vague concern of the morality 
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system. Something more concrete is needed to foster and carry these counterfactual 
expectations so that they can be projected against any discrepant reality in the future. Thus it 
is useful to identify a concrete example of the limits of law in relation to such normative 
expectations. This will not only refine understanding of the problem, but it will reveal the 
‘connecting threads’ to a solution.  
 
 
A CONCRETE EXAMPLE OF THE LIMITS OF LAW 
 
Drawing attention to the limits of law is by no means easy. While lawyers may be consumed 
with an argumentative practice predicated upon distinguishing between ‘what is legal, and what 
is not’, the limits of law remain notoriously elusive.57 Law’s expansive tendencies mean that it 
has evolved techniques for clouding the very issue of its own boundaries, and this faculty has 
proved especially useful for maintaining law’s functional relevance in globalised society.58 
There is, however, one concrete example of the limits of law in reference to expectations of 
global public goods: the World Court’s 1996 advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons.59  
Expectations of the prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons found increasing 
formulation in world society after their use at the end of the Second World War, although 
expression of antinuclear norms became more pronounced from the 1960s onwards. By the 
early 1990s, such expectations had gathered enough momentum to prompt the World Health 
Organisation (WHO)60 and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to request an 
advisory opinion of the court in The Hague on the question as to whether the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons is permitted under international law.61 On admitting the request, the Court 
acknowledged its objective was ‘to determine the legality or illegality of the threat.’62 No 
sooner had the Court embarked upon the task, however, when it was confronted with the 
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constraints of ‘the policy of deterrence’ that had been adhered to for many years by an 
‘appreciable section of the international community’,63 and the ‘fundamental right’ of national 
self-defence contained in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.64 Stumped by the tension 
between these structural constraints and the importance of the nuclear weapons question, the 
Court was forced to admit that it was having difficulty reaching a ‘definitive conclusion as to 
the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons’.65 In the end, by seven votes to seven 
with the President’s casting vote, the Court conceded that it could not ‘conclude definitively 
whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme 
circumstance of self-defence’.66 
This is generally accepted to be a rare example of non liquet.67 The principle of non 
liquet (which literally means ‘its not clear’) has undergone a ‘long evolutionary process’ to 
emerge in modern legal systems as a prohibition of the denial of justice and a compulsion on 
courts to decide every case that is admitted before them.68 Today that principle is codified in 
the constitutional provisions of many civil law jurisdictions,69 and is widely reflected in 
common law systems which have accommodated ‘the institution of “judge-made” law.’70 
Traditionally, international law was able to reflect this general evolution of law and present 
itself as a complete legal order by relying on the ‘residual negative principle’ that found its 
classical statement in the judgment of the Permanent Court in the 1927 Lotus case: ‘whatever 
is not expressly prohibited by international law is permitted’.71 This led Kelsen, for example, 
to consider that non liquet in international law was ‘logically not possible’.72 
While this line of thinking may have staved off questions about the completeness of the 
international legal system for some years, the advent of globalised society and the 
consequential explosion of global norms quickly called the principle into question. In his 
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declaration in the Nuclear Weapons opinion, the President of the Court remarked on how the 
world had changed since the Lotus case—how ‘globalization’ and ‘progress in the 
technological sphere, which now makes possible the total and virtually instantaneous 
eradication of the human race’ had necessitated a move away from an international law of 
‘cooperation’ to one of ‘co-existence’.73 The World Court, he argued, was in a much more 
difficult position than the Permanent Court that decided the Lotus case in 1927, and could not, 
therefore, follow the residual negative principle, but instead had to assert a new counter 
principle that ‘what is not expressly prohibited by international law is not therefore 
authorized.’74 
Whatever reasons lay behind it, the non liquet in the Nuclear Weapons opinion 
represents a clear limit to law in relation to cogently formulated expectations of a global public 
good. In order to promote the recursivity of system-specific communications, and generally 
stimulate communication in a way to stop itself from ‘running aground’,75 law must apply its 
own internally constructed binary code (e.g., ‘legal/illegal’) to proceedings. This is how the 
system secures its autopoiesis under limited conditions.76 But just as importantly, this also 
secures the legal system’s function. When the social system uses a problem-reference as a 
‘guiding difference’ for the construction of its own binary code, and when it achieves its 
autopoiesis on this basis, the system acquires ‘universal relevance’ for the problem.77 In other 
words, if the legal system runs aground in reference to cogently formulated normative 
expectations, it will lose its functional relevance in this respect, and the problem will look for 
solutions in functional equivalents which can so sustain themselves in this reference.  
In her dissenting opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case, Judge Higgins reminded the 
Court that there are ‘useful devices’ which ‘preclude the Court from pleading non liquet in any 
given case’.78 Yet, it seems the difficulties in the case of nuclear weapons were such that the 
Court could not employ these devices. The Court failed to apply its own code to the question, 
and the non liquet involved the admission of a ‘rejection value’, that is a ‘third value’ from 
beyond the international legal system which negated the binary code of legal/illegal as the basis 
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of choice.79 This not only invited systemic ‘disintegration’ and threatened to expose 
foundational paradoxes of the legal system,80 but, more importantly for present purposes, it 
negated the function of law in reference to normative expectations of the prohibition of nuclear 
weapons. As international law could not reproduce and expand itself on this basis, nor could it 
function to stabilise such normative expectations. Sitting at the centre of the only legal system 
which can address expectations that sovereign states will be constrained in the threat or use of 
such weapons, the Court’s communicated failure to apply its own code to the question involved 
a loss of universal functional relevance to antinuclear norms for law in general. 
Despite this loss of functional relevance to the anti-nuclear norm, however, the Court’s 
opinion in no way revoked or muted the recognition that the norm had received in the process 
leading up to the conclusion of the opinion. The Court did not state that nuclear weapons were 
‘legal’ and that expectations of the prohibition of nuclear weapons should, therefore, be 
modified—that they should learn to live with the disappointment. The case is unique because 
it explicitly denied the residual negative principle of the Lotus judgment. In that sense, the 
Court’s non-decision left room for, even promoted, the formulation and recognition of anti-
nuclear norms at a more primary social level, and may even have further primed its 
counterfactuality in this respect.81  
The Nuclear Weapons Opinion is, therefore, a rare example of the clear limits of law in 
relation to expectations of global public goods, as well as a flashpoint recording the persisting 
normativity of those expectations. This is what invites a search for functional equivalents. From 
a systems theoretical perspective, one can suppose that, despite law’s failure, society has 
evolved, and even that ‘the problem will have already been solved’.82  
 
 
THE SOLUTION OF TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANISATIONS 
 
One does not need to search extensively along the path of antinuclear expectations at the site 
of the limits of law to reveal alternative structures that could provide solutions to the problem. 
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These structures were clearly noted by several of the judges in their separate opinions in the 
Nuclear Weapons case as the ‘powerful pressure groups’ and ‘NGOs’ which provided the 
impetus for the request for an advisory opinion,83 and which were noted to ‘come from all 
countries, cover all walks of life, and straddle the globe’.84 The Nuclear Weapons Opinion has 
ultimately become a ‘famous example’ of the influence of transnational civil society 
organisations on judicial proceedings in a legal system which has traditionally afforded little 
recognition to any subjects other than nation-states and international organisations.85  
The projection of the antinuclear norm before the World Court was a result of a ‘World 
Court Project’ launched by three civil society organisations in 1992: International Physicians 
for the Prevention of Nuclear Weapons (IPPNW), International Association of Lawyers 
Against Nuclear Weapons (IALANA), and the International Peace Bureau (IPB).86 The IPPNW 
had originally mounted a ‘coordinated intensive campaign’ in every country in which it had 
members, visiting national health ministers and making further ‘soundings’ within the WHO 
bureaucracy as to the viability of the resolution requesting an advisory opinion from the 
Court.87 When the WHO met for its annual general assembly in Geneva in 1993, the IPPNW 
sent its own delegation to lobby health ministers for a resolution requesting an advisory opinion 
on a question that was drafted by IALANA lawyers.88 At the same time, the organisations were 
lobbying the Non-Aligned Movement within the UNGA as an alternative, more robust, route 
to securing an advisory opinion of the World Court on the issue. Despite the fact that civil 
society groups have no right of representation before the Court in advisory opinions, once the 
UNGA resolution had been secured, the organisations became heavily involved in preparing 
submissions for the case, with IALANA offering ‘on the spot’ legal advice to any supportive 
government deputations.89  
Since the 1996 advisory opinion, the IPPNW, IALANA and other organisations have 
continued to pursue the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.  As part of its ‘Back to Court’ 
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project,90 IALANA, for example, has worked with another civil society organisation, the 
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, to shepherd claims brought by the Royal Marshall Islands 
(RMI)—a small island state which has suffered health and environmental problems due to a 
history of explosive testing of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific—against prominent 
nuclear weapons states. This has included an application to the World Court against nine 
nuclear weapons states for their failure to comply with their obligations under the 1995 Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—although this time the Court was not going to make the same 
mistake it did in 1996, and thus used procedure (not substance!) to declare that there was no 
dispute that would serve as the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction.91 The ‘Back to Court’ project 
also included a similar complaint filed against the United States government in a U.S. Federal 
District Court in 2014, which was dismissed because, inter alia, it raised a ‘fundamentally non-
justiciable political question’.92 In both cases, IALANA has been actively involved in the 
RMI’s applications. The organisation’s vice president was the chair of the RMI’s lawyer’s 
committee, and IALANA lawyers were reported to be working a lot on the case behind the 
scenes.93  
The IPPNW, on the other hand, has pursued a nuclear weapons ban treaty to be ratified 
by the majority of non-nuclear weapons states in the hope of eventually pressuring nuclear 
weapons states into compliance. Frustrated with the lack of progress at NPT Review 
Conferences and inspired by the notorious well-organised and cohesive civil society campaign 
which led to the adoption of the Ottawa Treaty banning landmines,94 the organisation decided 
in 2007 to establish the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), as the 
‘the next stage of doctors, mayors and citizens joining with governments to work for a Nuclear 
Weapons Convention’.95 A clear example of what Ahrne and Brunsson call a ‘meta-
organization’,96 ICAN has been heavily involved with organising the 2014 Vienna Conference 
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for ICAN’s ability to establish structural relations with national governments, international 
organisations and key transnational civil society organisations such as Amnesty International 
and The International Committee of the Red Cross.99 
These are just a few examples of the actions these organisations have taken in recent 
years for the promotion of the anti-nuclear norm in world society. But what is important to note 
in these examples is the way in which these entities have pursued the goals of the anti-nuclear 
movement through formal organisation. The IPPNW, for example, is a formal organisation 
with a constitution which clearly establishes its goals in advancing ‘research, education, and 
advocacy relevant to the prevention of nuclear war’;100 its membership is open to those national 
or regional medical organisations or individuals who are judged to be ‘working for’ the 
established goals of the organisation in the prevention of nuclear war;101 and this is overseen 
by a hierarchical structure, with an International Council which meets at least once every other 
year, and a Board of Directors which is appointed by the Council to implement IPPNW’s 
policies.102 IALANA is also a formal organisation with established goals for ‘the complete 
elimination of nuclear arms and the prevention of nuclear war;’103 membership is based on 
agreement and conduct in accordance with IALANA’s goals;104 and the organisation has a 
hierarchy represented by a General Assembly as its ‘supreme body’,105 and a Board of Directors 
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who ‘support and supervise’ an Executive Committee which is charged with implementing the 
policy of the organisation.106  
Traditionally, under the dominance of Weberian notions of organisation, it was thought 
that the reliance of protest movements upon organisation would only lead to a collapse into 
bureaucracy and conformity with the status quo ante.107 Yet, since the 1960s, social scientists 
have drawn attention to the way in which protest movements have increasingly relied upon 
formal organisation for improved administration, leadership, collection of resources and to 
encourage participation in the social movement.108 Indeed, the emergence of organisations like 
the IPPNW and the IALANA in the 1980s can be seen a part of a well-noted proliferation of 
TSMOs in world society since the 1970s.109 The singular commitment of these organisations 
to the normative goals of specific protest movements endows them with a special autonomy. 
Unconcerned with profit or other parochial interests, they function to promote ‘collective 
benefits, public good, the common weal, or the welfare of diffuse categories’.110  Because they 
do not have to answer to shareholders or an electorate and are absolved from responsibility for 
broader political objectives, they can focus on the promotion of specific norms.111 
 
1. The function of social movement organisations in stabilising norms 
    
A delicate balance has thus been achieved between formal organisation and the promotion of 
the normative goals of spontaneous protest movements, and the singularity of this achievement 
marks social movement organisation as a potential solution to the problem of increasing 
expectations of global public goods which go under-accommodated in law. If one takes the 
meaning dimensions which Luhmann used to construct the function of law—meaning 
dimensions which are used to ‘emphasize the universality of the claim to validity’112—then the 
formal organisation of social movements can be seen to carry out a similar function.  
This is most evident in relation to the social dimension. As stated, norms will be 
generalised in this dimension when they are co-expected by anonymous third parties 
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represented by the institution. Not only do these organisations represent normative expectations 
of global public goods, but the norms often provide the basis of the formal structure of many 
of those organisations. The ‘goals’ of Greenpeace, for example, may include ‘stopping 
forestation for palm oil’, ‘stopping overfishing in the high seas’, ‘ending the use of hazardous 
chemical globally’, and so on,113 while the criteria for membership is an agreement to ‘pursue 
objectives compatible’ with those goals,114 and Greenpeace has a Council which makes 
decisions to that end, and an International Board which ratifies and carries out those 
decisions.115 As such, social movement organisations can be said to stand for certain norms. 
They are collective action on the specific issue of the norm, and as removed institutional 
structures they provide for the generalisation of those expectations beyond the immediate 
interaction context in which such norms might arise.116 The normative expectations of people 
living in the most remote parts of the world will be echoed by the expectations of anonymised 
third parties represented by the organisation. And this social generalisation is only more 
effective if the organisation is based as ‘far away’ as Amsterdam, Geneva or any other city in 
the ‘Global North’.117 They institutionalise the norm on the world stage. 
In the factual dimension, it is clear that, as far as the normative basis of the decisions 
and goals of social movement organisations are communicated, they provide a broader context 
to which expectations arising in various social situations throughout the globe can be linked, 
and are thereby imbued with a deeper meaning. Thus, for example, normative expectations of 
the prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons may arise in different interactional 
settings, from the inhabitants of a small Pacific island state with expectations in relation to 
problems they face today as a result of explosive testing in their region, to the citizens of a 
global city who see nuclear weapons as an unjustifiable global risk, to officials of an 
independent nation-state who oppose nuclear weapons as a threat to their own national security. 
Yet, all of those expectations can attach to the more abstract decision premise of the 
organisation devoted to the elimination of nuclear weapons, and can gain meaning through the 
association. Admittedly, there is not the same scope for the scale of the cultural store of ideas 
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that we expect from law. But this only highlights a key insight about this development: the 
proliferation of social movement organisations suggests instead that society is evolving 
towards a much more fragmented institutionalisation of norms. 
Finally, this leads to the temporal dimension, and perhaps the most important, as this 
appears to be the cornerstone of the specialisation of social movement organisation. As stated, 
Luhmann did not explore the function of social movement organisation, yet the blueprint for 
the function in the temporal dimension can be developed by mining the insights of his 
organisational theory. According to this, organisations differentiate themselves on the basis of 
their decisions—they ‘produce decisions from decisions, and in this sense are operationally 
closed systems.’118 This is built on the idea that every decision serves as a ‘premise’ for later 
decisions in the organisation.119  The decision premise is not re-opened, to be decided again, 
as this would only paralyse the organisation. Rather it is taken as decided, and thereby provides 
a structural precondition of further decisions. The decided decision premise thereby becomes 
the organisation’s formal structure,120 generating ‘possibilities for decision-making that would 
not otherwise exist’.121 For example, an organisation may decide that the United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights should be a ‘reality for the world’s people’.122 
Thereafter, all decisions on membership, on funding, on future projects, and so on, will grow 
out of this original decision premise. It is for this reason that organisations are described as 
‘decision machines’,123 or ‘systems made up of decisions’.124 The organisations cannot make 
decisions outside of itself,125 and, at the same time, every formal decision, from the founding 
of the organisation to the occupation of membership roles by persons, must be ‘treated 
recursively in the organisation as its own decisions’.126  
This not only allows organisations to differentiate themselves out as self-contained 
collective action systems, but it also enables them to absorb a considerable degree of societal 
uncertainty. Once again, this builds on insights of classic organisation studies, and that 
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‘[u]ncertainty absorption takes place when inferences are drawn from a body of evidence and 
the inferences, instead of the evidence itself, are then communicated.’127 This is typical of 
modern organisations. Because the decision premise does not need to be re-decided, it does not 
pass on the uncertainty in such a way that it can become an aggregated condition of the 
organisation.128 Instead, the information is ‘condensed at each stage and conclusions are drawn 
that are no longer checked at the next stage’.129 Prior to the decision, there is uncertainty 
because of the open possibilities, and once the decision is made and an option has been chosen, 
the uncertainty is reduced.130  
The classic concept of uncertainty absorption has to be developed further, however, 
with the observation that it is not the decision itself which absorbs the uncertainty, ‘but a 
process that connects decisions.’131 In this way, uncertainty is absorbed at each successive 
connection between decision premise and decision. Such a graduation of the concept of the 
decision premise from the structural to the processual level is especially important for 
explaining how organisations generalise norms in the temporal dimension. As Knudsen points 
out, it is in the ‘time-dimension that decisions fixate contingency and absorb uncertainty’, and 
this absorption of uncertainty even takes the form of the ‘stabilization of expectations’.132 The 
expectation is carried through time by the recursive decision making of the formal organisation, 
primed and ready to be projected at a discrepant future, and any uncertainty surrounding it is 
absorbed from decision to decision.  
These insights take on new meaning in relation to the problem of expectations of global 
public goods which cannot be directly accommodated by society’s legal system. The decision-
premise of many social movement organisations is to engage in collective organisation to 
secure the realisation of such normative expectations, and every decision those formal 
organisations take after that carries the normative projection through time and absorbs any 
societal uncertainty surrounding it. In this way, the social movement organisation becomes a 
channel through which the norm can be carried and a chamber through which social tension 
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arising from the problem of such expectations can be dissipated and diffracted. The 
organisation becomes a self-contained structure into which those norms can expand endlessly 
without conflict, even without realisation in the general social system, therefore allowing for 
the absorption of the complexity that ensues in the mismatch of expectations of global public 
goods and the traditional avenue of the legal system.  
However, this by itself is not enough to provide a proper alternative solution to the 
problem of normative expectations of global public goods. If TSMOs are simple abstract 
decision machines for norms, a void into which those norms can expand with an infinite 
regress, they would not provide an adequate functional equivalent to law. Of course, normative 
expectations are not dependent on enforceability mechanisms which would guarantee the 
realisation of the expectations—they can resist learning from disappointing experience. For 
TSMOs, the measured structural autonomy from this obligation can even be said to form the 
basis of their capacity to represent ‘subject matter that none of the function systems, neither 
politics, nor the economy, neither religion nor education, neither science or law would 
acknowledge as its own.’133 However, to foster such expectations, and thereby offer a real 
alternative to law, TSMOs must at least maintain structural relationships which appear to 
guarantee the potential enforceability of norms.134 To be more precise, this requires building a 
structural relationship with the existing structural coupling of politics and law at the 
international level, a task which is made all the more complex by that structural coupling having 
evolved through both the functional differentiation of law and politics and the segmentary 
differentiation of the nation-state. Sovereignty is part of the problem for global public goods 
of course, but so long as civil society can engage the organisations of the international legal 
and political systems, it can unfold the paradox and present the potential successful realisation 
of the norm within sovereign nation-states. The international legal system may not yet be able 
to accommodate many expectations of global public goods—perhaps it never will. But one 
must be able to expect that if the requisite international legal institutions develop, the norm will 
be sufficiently stabilised in civil society organisation as to be primed to connect with any 
emergent legal and political structures.  
Rather than requiring methods of ‘steering’ or ‘power’, however, the solution to this 
problem is achieved through the specialised communicative capacity of TSMOs.  
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Organisations are the only form of social system which can engage in ‘communication on 
behalf of the collective’, and therefore the only social systems that communicate with other 
systems in their environment.135 Interaction systems with face-to-face contact can only 
communicate within the boundary of present participants, and can only relate to their 
environment as ‘absence’.136 Functional systems like law or politics, on the other hand, cannot 
enter into outward communication as entities.137 Therefore, whoever wishes to communicate 
as a collective with their environment must organise. Organisations not only communicate 
outward on behalf of the collective, they are also the ‘only social systems in modern society 
that can be addressed as collective actors.’138 It is for this reason that organisations are 
necessary to ‘install forms of reflexivity into the function systems’,139 and why modern society 
is now ‘flooded by representational communication’ that is directed at other organisations, ‘but 
never to the function-systems or to the entire society.’140  
This communicative capacity of organisations is very important in the context of 
normative expectations of global public goods which go unrealised in law. Building upon the 
way in which the counterfactuality of the norm can remain charged through the recursive 
decision-making of the social movement organisation, the communicative capacity afforded 
by the organisational form means that the norm can be simultaneously circulated within its 
societal environment as a proto-legal communication and continuously projected in this form 
at organisations of the international legal system. Moreover, this communicative capacity is 
even more pronounced in social movement organisations which are able to establish a structural 
coupling with the mass media which ensures that the ‘mise-en-scene’ of large scale protest 
movements is presented as a mirror of public opinion and a focal point for their normative 
expectations.141 Indeed, previous research has highlighted the increasing role of transnational 
civil society organisations in securing ‘norm cascades’ in the international public sphere,142 as 
the ‘engines of the global expansion of human rights’, 143 and as ‘socializing’ governments into 
codification of human rights and general welfare norms.144 
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Yet, while the communicative capacity of social movement organisations contributes 
to such ‘norm cascades’, all that is required for the generalisation of global public goods norms 
in the temporal dimension is a communicative capacity to keep norms circulating in their social 
environment as norms, and thus a presented possibility of a norm cascade in future. The social 
movement organisation cannot guarantee the norm will be realized—it has not got the power 
to do so—but it can keep the norm on the world stage, primed for realisation some day in the 
future, throughout world society and within the necessary secondary differentiation of 
sovereign nation-states.  
Together with its specialisation of recursive decision making on the basis of the norm, 
this unique communicative capacity of social movement organisation achieves a decisive 
generalisation of the norm in the temporal dimension.  
Using Luhmann’s scheme then, the formal organisation of social movements can be 
said to achieve the congruent generalisation of normative expectations of global public goods 
in the social, factual and temproal dimensions. Social movement organisation provides an 
institutional observer who co-expects expectations of global public goods. Such organisation 
provides a more abstract social meaning to those expectations. Through its decisions, the 
organisation carries such expectations through time and keeps them primed for projection at 
any discrepant reality in the future. Through its communicative capacity, the organisation can 
keep pitching these normative expectations at the international legal and political system, 
waiting for the day, if it ever comes, where those expectations can be positivized as law. In 
other words, the emergence of this form of organisation in recent years appears to be a 
functional equivalent to law in reference to normative expectations of global public goods. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The thesis presented here of the function of TSMOs in relation to normative expectations of 
global public goods presents an alternative explanation of the proliferation of this form of 
organisation in globalised society, beyond notions of ‘resource mobilisation’145 and fragmented 
‘political process’.146 This presents an alternative thesis of such organisational proliferation as 
functional differentiation in response to the problems which globalisation has exposed in 
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modern law and governance structures. The article has not claimed this as a universal empirical 
reality, but it presents this as a real possibility that is worth further specialised empirical 
research.  
 Apart from its utility for the design of such method, the theory offers several useful 
observations. First, it questions the degree to which civil society organisations are really 
involved in ‘political process’, and whether some of what is captured and labelled as ‘global 
governance’ is not instead a different, apolitical function of stabilising expectations of global 
public goods. If one ignores the specialised functional relationship between civil society 
organisation and normative expectations of global public goods, one can easily conflate the 
public authority which comes with that form of public representation with the different public 
authority needed to make collectively binding decisions at the global level. This observation 
fits with existing concerns that ‘the study of TSMs tends to magnify their strength and role in 
the shaping of policies at the global and regional level’, and that this ‘general tendency is often 
achieved at the expense of more fine-tuned analysis of the areas which TSMs are likely to 
influence, their amount of influence, and the way in which it is achieved.’147 Such observations 
should not detract anything from global governance studies of course, but rather are offered to 
increase awareness of an alternative functional specialisation of TSMOs that should only refine 
global governance studies, and contribute to the development of a more precise focus on 
governance at the transnational level.  
Secondly, in underlining the importance of civil society organisation in the global 
normative order and in highlighting the contingency of law as a solution in this respect, the 
theory presented here raises certain questions about the prevailing general exclusion of TSMOs 
from the international legal system. To date, international law has afforded little recognition of 
the legitimacy of TSMOs in contributing to the global public order.148 Although in recent years 
more avenues of participation have opened up in this respect,149 TSMOs are generally 
categorised there as ‘non-governmental organisations’. As such, they suffer the same general 
marginalisation of NGOs in formal international legal process and have just as limited standing 
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to bring public interest litigation in respect of global public goods.150 The perspective gained 
here, however, abstracts this form of organisation out from the dominating semantic value of 
the nation-state in law, and steps away from the operative distinction of ‘governmental’/‘non-
governmental’ which effectively renders civil society organisations non-entities in the centre 
of the legal system. Moreover, it suggests that the fragmentation which international lawyers 
commonly read as mere ‘diversification and expansion of international law’,151 runs much 
deeper, and presents this instead as a more general fragmentation of normative 
institutionalisation out beyond the nation-state. From a functional perspective at least, this 
general fragmentation of normative institutionalisation enjoys as much ‘public authority’ as it 
would in a narrower specialisation of this function in the nation-state or the international 
organisation. With this, it resonates (tentatively) with existing questions as to whether these 
organisations should not be afforded more legitimacy as a subject of both law and legal 
research.152 
We need to be careful here though—descriptions can be functional too.153 From the 
perspective gained here, one can also see how the prevailing description of TSMOs (and the 
social movements they represent) as ‘non-governmental’ or ‘marginal’ may have some 
functional relevance to the self-description of the global political system. Global problems can 
no longer be presented as solvable problems within the framework of independent nation-
states. Under these conditions, the political system is quickly exhausted and its limits are 
exposed. With this, there is both less stability and less variability. Less stability because there 
are important aspects of society outside the state’s control. Less variability because the limits 
of the state in this respect are clear and appear terminal. However, the evolution of social 
movement organisation presents an alternative in this respect. Even if social movement 
organisations cannot govern global issues (cannot ‘steer’, do not have ‘power’), they can 
communicate an ‘external standpoint’154 which in turn stimulates political communication. 
This would be further evidence of the way in which ‘modern society has destabilized its 
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structures and enriched its potential for saying ‘no’’, and that it is increasingly unimportant 
‘whether the ‘no’ is articulated from positions of legal strength or in the context of social 
movements’.155  
The proliferation of TSMOs in this sense represents an internal differentiation of the 
global political system.  On the semantic level at least, it decentres the state as the ‘universal 
point of reference for politics’,156 and activates political communication on the global scale. 
Sovereignty will always interrupt the paradox of this description, of course, just as it frustrates 
the realisation of global public goods, but in doing so it provides the other side of a distinction, 
a governance which can be opposed. In this way, politics does not run aground with 
globalisation and can overcome some of the most stalling problems of sovereignty in world 
society.   
If ‘non-governmental organisations’ have achieved such a semantic value in the 
political system, then their contribution to meaningful communication in world society may 
well depend upon their continued marginalisation from central political structures. This would 
only stunt the further inclusion of TSMOs into an international legal system which remains 
structurally coupled with the global political system of segmentarily differentiated sovereign 
states. The co-evolution of the political system and social movement organisation under these 
conditions could then involve an entrenched dislocation of the latter from power as a 
generically symbolised form of communication. This raises the possibility that the semantic 
value of such organisations to the global political system could undermine the operational 
value of such organisations in the universal realisation of global public goods.  
There is perhaps another possibility, nonetheless, that these semantic structures are 
capable themselves of providing some basis for an expanded political system and its structural 
coupling with law at the global level. The question, ultimately, is whether the semantic value 
of the social movement organisation in its liminal ‘opposition’ will acquire a constitutional 
significance. Social movements are increasingly recognised for their role in an important 
‘constitutionalism from below’.157 Gunther Teubner (who has also employed Luhmann’s 
systems theory, albeit from a very different perspective), has, for example, recently presented 
the development of the social movement as a ‘sectorial constitution’ to which law can 
externalise its foundational paradox to gain legitimacy, and which in turn allows the social 
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movement to acquire legitimacy as part of a fragmented transnational public order which is 
free from state constitutions.158 The thesis presented here, however, suggests that constitutional 
studies can only be developed in this direction through a methodological shift away from 
distinctions such as ‘spontaneous/organised-professional’,159 or ‘left-wing/right-wing’160 
which obscure the importance of social movement organisation. More radical still, it will 
require a fundamental shift away from focusing on the problem of political unity at the 
transnational level and the solution of specialised and pluralistic constitutionalism, and a switch 
instead to a focus on the problem of stabilising highly generalised normative expectations of 
global public goods and its alternative solutions.  
The necessary shift applies also to the prevailing governance and power focus in legal 
conceptions of global public goods, but it relates on an even more general level to the so-called 
‘post-modern’ development of social sciences. Conceptions of common concern and a global 
public are commonly avoided in research as they appear utopian and unrealistic in relation to 
the obvious pluralism of world society. Attention has generally shifted instead to what can be 
achieved through a network of specialised and differentiated public spheres. However, the 
paradigm has only obscured insights into how highly generalised expectations of global public 
goods are important to the evolution of world society (a co-dependency of specialisation and 
generalisation). This article has focused on the functional differentiation of civil society 
organisations in relation to global public goods as an example of the complex structural 
arrangements which emerge under these conditions. In doing so, it stresses the importance of 
a proper engagement of the problems of highly generalised expectations of global public goods 
as a possible step towards a more ecological development of society’s legal system.  
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